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Abstract 
 
A significant portion of human rights instruments in the world contain rights that are 
‘freedoms from’ governmental intrusion, reflecting traditional liberal sensibilities that the 
state can be a danger to human rights. But the state is arguably no longer the principal 
threat to the security of the individual: human rights are being violated much more by non-
state actors such as suspected terrorists. In 2017, for example, the UK was the victim of 
several terror attacks from individuals with alleged links to Islamist groups: atrocities 
committed on Westminster and London Bridges in London in March and June respectively; 
and a suicide bombing at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester in May. In the so called 
‘War on Terror’, to counter these Islamist atrocities, many, particularly those in the media, 
see human rights merely as a vehicle to secure the ‘undeserving’ rights of terror suspects 
over the more important rights of victims. The idea that human rights protect the ‘few’ over 
the ‘many’ has therefore contributed to a substantial disengagement with the topic of 
fundamental freedoms. Is it time, therefore, for a ‘rethink’ about the nature and significance 
of human rights? 
 
Moreover, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2016, significant factors causing 
terrorism, particularly in Europe, are socio-economic ones: inequality, youth employment 
and drug crime. Indeed, in Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State Revisited, Europol, 
2016, the vast majority of terrorist attackers in Europe have been young men with a criminal 
past, who were not strict Muslims and only recently converted to Islam. The attacker 
responsible for the terror attack on Westminster Bridge in London, for example, Khalid 
Masood, born Adrian Russell Ajao, was a Muslim convert, of African-Caribbean descent, 
with a history of violence spanning 20 years. Was Masood failed by human rights? In their 
seeming absoluteness (or at least those enshrined in America’s Bill of Rights), do human 
rights also attach too little weight to responsibilities, particularly to those on the periphery 
of society, who could so spectacularly turn against a society that allegedly alienates them? A 
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re-engagement with human rights for the 21st Century, along the lines of the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights, for example, to encompass a rights debate that is less 
individualistic and more inclusive, which seeks to challenge marginalisation and foster a 
collective sense of duty and responsibility, is the principal aim of this paper. 
 
Introduction 
 
If asked ‘what are human rights?’, rather than give an erudite, conceptual reply about the 
nature and significance of fundamental freedoms, a person is very likely to give examples of 
rights, drawing on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) for inspiration. The 
UDHR was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 as ‘a common 
standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations’.1 It consists of freedoms that 
people associate with the ‘first generation’2 of rights such as: the right to life, liberty and 
security of person, Article 3; no one shall be held in slavery and servitude, Article 4; and no 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, Article 5. The UDHR also consists of rights that people associate with the 
‘second generation’3 such as: the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment, Article 23(1); 
everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, Article 25(1); and everyone has the right to education, Article 
26(1). The UDHR also consists of rights that people associate with the ‘third generation’4 
such as: everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised, Article 28. Whilst some 
commentators have claimed that the UDHR is a source of customary international law,5 the 
                                                 
1 UNGA Res 217 (10 December 1948) <http://www.un-documents.net/a3r217a.htm> 
accessed 1 June 2018. 
2 The phrase ‘generation of rights’ is commonly attributed to the French jurist Karel Vasak. 
See, for example: Karel Vasak, ‘A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to give Force of 
Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ 30 UNESCO Courier, November 1977, 29-
32. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
5 Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: 
3 
 
majority of opinion, supported, by, for example, the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain,6 is that it is not.7 Thus, whilst the collection of rights contained in the 
UDHR is non-justiciable, specific rights located within the Declaration are in fact enforceable 
before the courts. 
 
Using justiciablity as an indicator of the primacy of a freedom within a catalogue of human 
rights, we can see that the first generation – ‘civil and political rights’ – clearly prevails. 
Although only a regional document the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a 
classic source of justiciable, first generation rights, in that it permits individuals to make 
applications to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, as per Article 34 
of the ECHR. For example, over 93,000 applications by nationals alleging breaches of the 
Convention against their home countries were processed by the ECtHR in 2017.8 Indeed, 
when the United Kingdom, this author’s country, wished to give a collection of human rights 
the force of law within the Human Rights Act 1998, it drew on the ECHR for encouragement, 
incorporating the rights directly into domestic law. ‘Second generation’ rights, that is, ‘socio-
economic rights’, can be located in, for example, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In addition to non-justiciability, the rights contained in 
ICESCR are not ‘immediate’, unlike freedoms from the first generation. According to Article 
2(1) of ICESCR, each state party only undertakes to take steps to achieve ‘progressively’ the 
full realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant. The full realisation of second 
generation rights is also qualified in Article 2(1) by the phrase ‘to the maximum of its 
available resources’, further emphasising the supremacy of first generation rights over other 
generational ones. Thus, for the purposes of this chapter (at least for the time being), first 
generation freedoms are synonymous with the phrase ‘human rights’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Law, Politics, Morals. 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press 2007) 161. 
6 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004). 
7 See, for example, Eric Posner, ‘The Case Against Human Rights’ The Guardian. 4 December 
2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights> 
accessed 19 June 2018. 
8 The Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights: Analysis of Statistics 2017’ 
January 2018 <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2017_ENG.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2018, 9. 
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Human rights are justiciable and immediate. Conceptually, they are ‘negative’ ie 
‘freedoms from’ the state, such as ‘freedom from’ torture and ‘freedom from’ slavery. 
(Indeed, ‘freedoms from’ such as freedom from torture and slavery are especially important 
justifying international conventions of their own: the UN Convention Against Torture 
(UNCAT) and the Slavery Convention respectively.) These ‘negative’ freedoms reflect 
traditional liberal fears that the state is a threat to the security of the individual.9 Such fears 
are often attributed to the English philosopher, John Locke, and his Two Treatises of 
Government in particular. Locke sought to effect a civil authority that maintained collective 
peace and order. Pre-the institution of civil authority, man lived in the ‘state of nature’ – ‘a 
state of liberty’ – which was a state of ‘perfect freedom’ and ‘equality’,10 and ‘peace, good 
will, mutual assistance, and preservation’.11 Human rights for Locke, which he classified as 
‘life, liberty, and estate (property)’, were very important. They were ‘natural’ and individual, 
conferred by God.12 But in the absence of security in the ‘state of nature’ to protect 
individuals’ natural rights from those who sought to deny them, it was necessary for 
individuals to covenant – a ‘social contract’ – with a civil authority, a sovereign, to guarantee 
these rights.13 With Locke reluctantly transitioning to a civil authority from the perfect 
                                                 
9 In this chapter the author uses the term ‘liberal’ loosely. Here he positions John Locke as 
one of the founders of liberalism. But to be more precise, Locke would now be considered 
as a ‘libertarian’. The following commentators epitomise modern libertarianism: F A Hayek, 
The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 1960); Milton Friedman, Capitalism 
and Freedom (University of Chicago Press 1962); and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and 
Utopia (Basic Books 1974). Libertarians support a minimal role for the state such as 
enforcing contracts, protecting private property from theft and keeping the peace. That is, 
in the name of human freedom, they oppose government regulation and favour unfettered 
markets. People should do whatever they want with their things as long as they respect 
other peoples’ rights to do so – see, for example: Michael J Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right 
Thing to Do? (Penguin Books 2010) 58-74. 
10 Chapter II, though Locke did qualify this: ‘But though this be a state of liberty, yet is not a 
state of licence: though man in the state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his 
person or his possessions…the state of nature has a law of nature [my italics]…which obliges 
every one…that being all equal and independent, [not] to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions.’ (Chapter II) 
11 Chapter III. 
12 Chapter IX. 
13 The type of security provided by civil government was, for Locke, established laws, a body 
invested with the power of executing those laws and an independent arbiter to adjudicate 
on those laws. 
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freedom of the state of nature, it is unsurprising therefore that he approached the new 
sovereign with suspicion. So Locke advocated a minimal state whose power was limited to 
its preservation and could not be used ‘to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the 
subjects.’14 Thus, in addition to emphasising the primacy of the individual, the classic liberal 
approach to the state as a guarantor of rights, but, perhaps more importantly, as a possible 
violator of rights, is a significant influence on the predominant idea of liberties as being 
‘freedoms from’ the state. But since the 9/11 attacks, for example, in New York and 
Washington, by Al-Qaeda, and now the growing threat of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, as 
well as Boko Haram in Nigeria, is the state still the principal threat to the security of the 
individual: human rights are being violated much more by non-state actors such as 
suspected terrorists? 
 
In 2017 the UK, for example, was the victim of several terror attacks from individuals with 
alleged links to Islamist groups: an atrocity committed on Westminster Bridge in London in 
March, where the attacker drove his car along the bridge deliberately killing four people and 
injuring a further 50; a similar incident occurred on London Bridge in June, where the 
attackers, having to abandon their van, ran at pedestrians at a nearby market, fatally 
stabbing eight and injuring a further 40. And there was also a suicide bombing at an Ariana 
Grande concert in Manchester in May – the worst terror atrocity committed in the UK since 
‘7/7’ – killing 22 people and injuring a further 500. In addition, a bomb was left on a tube 
train at Parsons Green, west London, in September, but failed to fully explode. A further 
nine terrorist attacks, in 2017, were prevented.15 Recently, Andrew Parker, the Director-
General of MI5, the UK’s Security Service, said that Britain was facing its most severe 
terrorist threat ever and fresh attacks in the country were ‘inevitable’.16 The UK’s terror 
threat level is currently at ‘severe’, meaning an attack is highly likely. Twice in 2017 it was 
                                                 
14 Chapter XI. 
15 Chris Johnston, ‘Two detained under Terrorism Act as UK arrests reach record high’ The 
Guardian 29 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/29/two-
detained-under-terrorism-act-as-uk-arrests-reach-record-high> accessed 19 December 
2017. 
16 Vikram Dodd, ‘UK facing most severe terror threat ever, warns MI5 chief’ The Guardian 17 
October 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/17/uk-most-severe-
terror-threat-ever-mi5-islamist> accessed 19 December 2017. 
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raised to its maximum level, ‘critical’, meaning an attack was imminent, after the 
Manchester and Parsons Green attacks. The severe terror threat from non-state actors to 
the UK is real and set to continue.  
 
The UK can expect further terror atrocities and further high profile arrests. Those that are 
detained will claim their human rights: the right to liberty, for example – the right to be 
either released or charged in a matter of days; and the right to a fair trial – the right to 
either challenge one’s pre-charge detention, or, if one is charged, the right to be tried by an 
independent and impartial court or tribunal. But in in the so called ‘War on Terror’, many, 
particularly those in the media, see human rights as merely obstructions to countering 
terrorism. There are several headlines in the Daily Mail, for example, supporting this claim: 
‘Sorry, human rights DO shield terrorists’; 17 ‘PM vows to rip up human rights laws in war on 
terror’ 18; and ‘An insult to terror victims’19 being just a few examples. Reviewing the 
comments section for one of these articles, one finds reader remarks such as: ‘As usual, HIS 
‘human rights’ are considered to be MORE IMPORTANT than the lives of his potential 
victims’; ‘Put British human rights ahead of those who are trying to murder us’; ‘I really 
couldn't care less about his human rights, it's time we looked after this country’s citizens’ 
human rights, by weeding out these cockroaches’; and ‘blow his human rights, what about 
ours?’20. The common idea that freedoms are merely a vehicle to secure the ‘undeserving’ 
rights of terror suspects, for example, over the ‘deserving’ rights of victims has arguably 
contributed to a significant disengagement with the nature of rights. But even terror 
suspects are not best served by human rights either. According to the Global Terrorism 
Index 2016, significant factors causing terrorism, particularly in Europe, are socio-economic 
                                                 
17 Daily Mail Comment, ‘Sorry, human rights DO shield terrorists’ Daily Mail 8 June 2017 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-4583006/DAILY-MAIL-COMMENT-Human-
rights-shield-terrorists.html> accessed 19 December 2017. 
18 James Tapsfield, ‘PM vows to rip up human rights laws in war on terror’ Daily Mail 7 June 
2017 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4576146/PM-says-MI5-does-face-
questions-London-Bridge-killer.html> accessed 19 December 2017. 
19 Paul Bentley, ‘An insult to terror victims’ Daily Mail 8 June 2017 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4597508/Jihadi-fighting-stay-Britain-given-250k-
legal-aid.html> accessed 19 December 2017. 
20 ibid. 
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ones – inequality and youth unemployment – and drug crime.21 Indeed, other studies 
focusing on particular organisations or recruits from particular regions or cultures outside of 
Europe have found some common characteristics among individuals: exclusion and forms of 
discrimination.22 Similar findings were presented in the 2017 Index: ‘Individuals whose 
expectations for social mobility and economic welfare have been frustrated are at a greater 
risk of radicalisation.’23 Moreover, in Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State Revisited, 
for Europol, the vast majority of terrorist attackers in Europe have been young men with a 
criminal past – not just a history of drug crime – who were not strict Muslims and only 
recently converted to Islam.24 Indeed, the Global Terrorism Index 2017 states: ‘Terrorist 
organisations have also recruited many fighters with extensive criminal backgrounds…A 
study across Europe found that 57% of individuals had been in jail prior to becoming 
radicalised while 31% of incarcerated individuals began the radicalisation process while in 
jail.’25 The attacker responsible for the terror attack on Westminster Bridge in London in 
March 2017, for example, Khalid Masood, born Adrian Russell Ajao, was a Muslim convert, 
of African-Caribbean descent, with a history of violence spanning 20 years.26 
 
‘Joe Public’, or at least a typical reader of the Daily Mail, is contemptuous of human rights, 
especially in the so-called ‘War on Terror’; the rights of a terror suspect apparently trump 
the rights of the general public. It will also be recalled that the classic liberal idea views 
human rights as protectors of the individual from the state. With an emphasis on the 
                                                 
21 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016 
<http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-
2016.2.pdf> accessed 7 January 2017, 70. 
22 ibid 65. 
23 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2017 December 2017 
<http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf> 
accessed 19 December 2017, 65. 
24 Europol, Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State Revisited, 2016, 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-of-
islamic-state-revisited> accessed 19 December 2017, 8. 
25 Institute for Economics and Peace (n 21) 66. 
26 Robert Booth and Nazia Parveen, ‘Khalid Masood a violent criminal who was regularly on 
the move’ The Guardian 24 March 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/mar/23/birmingham-neighbour-khalid-masood-winson-green> accessed 8 May 
2017. 
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individual comes, for liberals, a natural corresponding scepticism towards increases in state 
power. Are human rights eschewing genuine efforts by the state to address drivers of 
terrorism, particularly in the West: discrimination, marginalisation and joblessness? Is there 
therefore a ‘crisis’ within human rights? On the one hand, there is a disengagement with 
rights since, in seemingly benefitting an undeserving minority, they are too individualistic 
and insufficiently majoritarian; and on the other, ironically, whilst suspected terrorists are 
accused (wrongly) of exploiting rights, freedoms are in fact too selfish and insufficiently 
inclusive, compromising security. Poor old human rights! It is time, therefore, for a ‘rethink’ 
about the nature and significance of human rights post 9/11, or at least move the discussion 
away from its traditional liberal, first generation foundations, which, for the purposes of this 
chapter, are insufficiently attentive to increases in state power pursuing legitimate 
collective goals. To that end, the next section of this piece will assess human rights (or at 
least those that rely on their enforceability by the courts) through the lens of critical legal 
theory, and critical legal studies in particular. Once legitimate criticisms have been raised 
about human rights as claims in law, this chapter will continue to assess human rights, 
theoretically, but from the perspective of communitarian ideals, since, in this author’s 
opinion, critical legal theory can only take the debate so far – communitarianism is a 
natural, critical progression.  Following communitarian critiques of liberal attitudes to rights, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) is examined. This positions 
human rights, it is believed, more appropriately within the clashes presented above. 
 
Critical legal theory and its attitudes towards human rights  
 
The most significant feature of critical legal theory is its rejection of what it is taken to be 
the natural order of things, be it the free market, patriarchy, or the conception of race.27 
The myth of determinacy in the law is a significant component of the critical assault on law. 
Far from being a determinate, coherent body of rules and doctrine, the law is depicted as 
uncertain, ambiguous, and unstable.28 One critical legal theorist, however, Jack M Balkin 
proposes an ‘ambivalent’ approach to the law, which recognises both the beneficial and 
                                                 
27 Raymond Wacks, Philosophy of Law. 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press 2014) 214. 
28 ibid. 
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harmful aspects of the law.29 For Balkin, whilst powerful people have ‘used law to 
subordinate others and secure their own interests’ under the guise of promoting laudable 
goals like freedom, equality, liberty, consent, community and human dignity, he believes 
that, by choosing to speak in the language of law, powerful people and interests can 
sometimes be called to account, because they try to legitimate what they are doing in these 
terms.30 In supporting an ‘ambivalent’ approach to the law, Balkin, perhaps unsurprisingly 
shows a fidelity to rights within his writings, particularly in times of crisis.31 
 
Within critical legal theory there is Critical Legal Studies (CLS). For CLS, law is ‘simply politics 
dressed in different garb’;32 it neither operates in a historical vacuum nor does it exist 
independently of ideological struggles in society.33 CLS also believes that legal doctrine not 
only does not, but also cannot, generate determinant results in concrete cases,34 meaning it 
can be ‘manipulated’ to justify an almost ‘infinite spectrum of possible outcomes’.35 Thus, in 
                                                 
29 Jack M. Balkin, ‘Critical Legal Theory Today’, in Francis J. Mootz III (ed), On Philosophy in 
American Law. (Cambridge University Press 2009), 64-72, 65. 
30  ibid 68. 
31 See, in particular: Jack M. Balkin, ‘The Constitution in the National Surveillance State’ 
(2008) 93 Minnesota Law Review, 1-25, where, for example, Balkin poses three major 
dangers to ‘our freedoms’ from the national surveillance state (at p.15-17). See also, for 
example: Jack M. Balkin, ‘The Rhetoric of Responsibility’ (1990) 76 Virginia Law Review, 197-
263; and Jack M. Balkin, ‘Ideology as Constraint’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review, 1133-1178. 
32 Allan C Hutchinson and Patrick J Monahan, ‘Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: 
the Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review, 199-245, 
206. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. Here one may wish to look further at the indeterminacy thesis. If one subscribes to 
the idea that laws have nothing to do with how cases are decided, that is, they are just 
window dressing that skilful lawyers and judges can manipulate to justify any decision they 
please, then this is indeed ‘indeterminacy’. However, if a court is faced with a multifarious 
number of possible legal outcomes, meaning that a judge will simply have to decide for one 
party rather than another, then to be precise, this is ‘underdeterminacy’ rather than 
‘indeterminacy’ – see, for example: Lawrence Solum, ‘Legal Theory Lexicon 036: 
Indeterminacy’ 
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/05/legal_theory_le_2.html> 
accessed 26 June 2018. Solum states: ‘The distinction between indeterminacy and 
underdeterminacy is rarely observed in the indeterminacy debate, but it is nonetheless 
important to assessing the debate. Claims that the law is radically indeterminate are 
implausible, but more modest claims about underdeterminacy may both be defensible and 
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emphasising the manipulation of the law, Mark Tushnet, for example, rejects the idea of an 
autonomous and neutral mode of legal reasoning.36 Behind this veil of seeming neutrality, 
Tushnet believes that the law is merely synonymous with the principles of liberalism and the 
emphasis on the individual.37 Liberal legalism, for CLS scholars, represents the status quo in 
society and that it seeks to mask the injustice of the system.38 With this apparent bias within 
the law, it is perhaps natural, therefore, for Tushnet and others to attack a ‘darling’ of 
liberalism: human rights.39 It is within this CLS assessment of liberalism, and especially its 
critique of human rights, that this chapter begins to position a theoretical re-engagement 
with rights away from their classic liberal traditions and the related controversies presented 
hitherto. 
 
Following CLS’s criticisms with the law more generally, one finds many of these applicable to 
justiciable rights in particular. Firstly, CLS scholars such as Mark Tushnet believe that the 
language of legal rights is so open and indeterminate.40 Within a human rights claim, there is 
commonly a ‘balancing’ exercise – a trade-off between an individual’s rights, such as free 
speech or freedom of assembly, and the legitimate interests of the state such as prevention 
of disorder and crime or national security (as per Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, for 
                                                                                                                                                        
play a role in a radical critique of liberal legal theory.’ 
36 Mark Tushnet, ‘Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies’ (1984) 52 George Washington Law 
Review, 239-242, 239. In its rejection of the neutrality in legal reasoning, there is maybe 
very little to distinguish Critical Legal Studies from the earlier ‘American legal realism’ of eg 
Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. But, according to Tushnet, whilst the realists accepted the 
indeterminacy of legal reasoning, they remained firmly committed to liberalism. And whilst 
they wanted a better understanding of how the law worked, they wanted to make the 
existing processes work better – not reject them (239). For other references to Tushnet’s 
critical legal studies ‘credo’, see, for example, Mark Tushnet, ‘Critical Legal Studies: an 
Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings’ (1986) 36 Journal of Legal Education, 505-
517; and Mark Tushnet, ‘A Critical Legal Studies Perspective’ (1990) 38 Cleveland State Law 
Review, 137-151. 
37 ibid 240.  
38 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, Textbook on Jurisprudence. 3rd ed. (Blackstone Press 
1999) 216. 
39 Mark Tushnet, ‘An Essay on Rights’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review, 1363-1403. But Tushnet 
does still believe citizens need protecting from the state, especially post 9/11 – see: Mark 
Tushnet, ‘Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terror’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law 
Review, 2673-2682. 
40 ibid 1371. 
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example). Tushnet believes for there to be an effective balancing exercise by the courts, 
competing interests must be reduced to some common measure of value, but in many 
instances this is simply not possible.41 Indeed, there is often a trade-off between rights 
which have a similar level of constitutional protection. Which right does the court give 
greater priority?42 
 
Drawing further on the indeterminacy argument within the law, Tushnet questions the 
‘utility of rights’. To say that rights are politically useful is to say that they do something, yet, 
for Tushnet, to say that rights are indeterminate is to say that one cannot know whether a 
claim of right will do anything.43 This suggests an indifference towards rights but in some 
circumstances Tushnet is much more explicit in his criticisms. In some situations, such as the 
emphasis on free speech in the First Amendment of the US Constitution, Tushnet believes 
that rights, rather than ‘not doing much good’, are positively ‘harmful’.44 He believes: 
 
‘I have yet to run across a decent argument that access to sexually explicit material 
of the sort protected by the [Supreme Court’s] obscenity decisions is itself a positive 
good. In the free press/fair trial controversy, the present balance between the 
interests of defendants and victims, on the one side, and the morbid curiosity of the 
press, on the other, is not obviously correct.’45  
 
In a separate article Tushnet further explores the criticisms of rights stated above. He claims 
that the discourse of rights reflects and produces a kind of isolated individualism.46 And on 
the indeterminacy thesis, and its corresponding rejection of neutrality, Tushnet claims that 
‘nothing whatever follows from a court’s adoption of some legal rule…except the ideological 
dimension with which the critique of rights is concerned’.47 Indeed, for Tushnet, legal 
                                                 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid 1373. 
43 ibid 1384. 
44 ibid 1386.  
45 ibid. 
46 Mark Tushnet, ‘The Critique of Rights’ (1993) 47 SMU Law Review, 23-34, 27. 
47 ibid 32. Tushnet uses the same words in another article, in attacking liberal legalism more 
generally – see: Mark Tushnet, ‘The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism’ (1981) 42 Ohio 
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victories can actually impede political goals. The victory may make those who won it 
complacent while galvanizing their opponents to do all they can to minimize the effects of 
the ruling.48  
 
More recent critics of human rights law include Hurst Hannum,49 Dominique Clement and 
Eric Posner. Clement, for example, is concerned about conflating every grievance as a 
human right; illiteracy, poverty, lack of health care should be framed as violators of social 
justice rather than rights. The language of human rights, for Clement, means the law, which 
is an ‘ineffective solution to a systematic social problem’.50 Moreover, the existence of a 
legal right must be premised on the ability of the state and society to guarantee such rights. 
Resources are limited, and any attempt to recognise all rights in an era of rights inflation 
forces people to prioritise some rights claims above others.51 In contrast, Posner frames his 
criticism of rights at the international level in particular. For Posner the international legal 
effort to force countries to protect human rights has failed; there is little evidence that 
countries that ratify human rights treaties improve their human rights performance.52 
 
Thus far, addressing the apparent ‘crisis’ within human rights, especially post 9/11, the 
author maybe ought not to do so through the lens of critical legal theory: a preponderance 
of critical legal theory, and its criticism of human rights in particular, suggests a rejection of 
rights as a tool for remedying the challenges presented hitherto. However, Tushnet is not 
                                                                                                                                                        
State Law Journal, 411-426, 425. 
48 ibid 30. 
49 Hurst Hannum, ‘Reinvigorating Human Rights for the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 16 
Human Rights Law Review, 409-451. 
50 Dominique Clement, ‘Human Rights or Social Justice: The Problem of Rights Inflation’ 
(2018) 22 The International Journal of Human Rights, 155-169, 160; and Dominique 
Clement, Debating Rights Inflation in Canada: a Sociology of Human Rights (Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press 2018). To continue the debate about the so-called benefits of increasing 
human rights claims more broadly, see: Carl Wellman, The Proliferation of Rights: Moral 
Progress or Empty Rhetoric? (Routledge 1998). 
51 ibid. 
52 See, for example, Eric Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law. Open Global Rights 25th 
November 2014 <https://www.openglobalrights.org/twilight-of-human-rights-law/> 
accessed 19 June 2018; and Eric Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law. (Oxford 
University Press 2014). See also: Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?’ 111 (2001-02) Yale Law Journal, 1935-2034.  
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entirely dismissive of rights: he only says that a critique of rights must caution against an 
overestimation of the significance of legal victories and the contributions lawyers can make 
to social progress.53 Indeed, within his ‘disutility’ criticism of human rights, Tushnet attacks 
the predominance of ‘negative’ rights, suggesting an openness to other rights. He believes 
that people usually agree that the present balance between negative and ‘positive’ rights ie 
‘rights to’, such as the ‘right to work’, is ‘askew’ and that positive rights should be created or 
strengthened. Yet it may be impossible to carry out that programme. In the US, for example, 
the language of negative rights supports a sharp distinction between the ‘threatening public 
sphere’ and the ‘comforting private one’. Tushnet therefore opposes the ‘contemporary 
rhetoric of rights’ which speaks primarily to negative ones.54 Thus, employing a CLS 
approach, greater weight should be attached to other generations of rights, not only 
because of the first generation’s strong association with the law and the courts, but also 
because of their traditional liberal foundations. 
 
Furthermore, if we were to continue to defend addressing the challenges posed in this 
chapter from a critical legal perspective, there are many other arguments from that 
tradition that can be presented in support. For example, in addition to the ‘ambivalent’ 
approaches to the law already expressed by Balkin,55 there are also scholars of feminist 
jurisprudence and critical race theory, such as Elizabeth Schneider and Kimberle Crenshaw, 
who believe that human rights claims are among the few resources that disempowered 
people have.56 Indeed, within the Marxist tradition, a philosophy well renowned for its 
                                                 
53 Tushnet (n 46) 25. 
54 Tushnet (n 39) 1392. 
55 Within critical legal theory Balkin is not alone in having an ambivalent approach towards 
the law – see, for example: Alan Hunt (n 54). Hunt, who believes CLS is synonymous with 
critical legal theory (5), and therefore can be labelled as a CLS scholar, says: ‘It is a travesty 
of the critical school to allege that their project is to show law in its worst light. A distinctive 
feature of critical scholarships is a deep perplexity about law. We perceive law as involving 
both negative and positive characteristics.’ (11). For a much more detailed discussion of 
Hunt’s approach to CLS, see, for example: Alan Hunt, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ 
(1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1-45. 
56 See, for example: Elizabeth M. Schneider, ‘The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives from the Women’s Movement’ (1986) 61 New York University Law Review, 
589-653; and Kimberle W. Crenshaw, ‘Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review, 1331-1387. 
14 
 
rejection of liberalism, legal scholars such as Paul O’Connell defend rights, since, for 
O’Connell, social movements around the world ‘continue to frame their struggles and 
demands, at least partly, through the language of human rights’.57 Thus, this piece will 
continue to defend a re-engagement with freedoms from the perspective of human rights 
claims, acknowledging the legitimate concerns of CLS. 
 
Often critics of CLS claim the principle is too easy to criticise liberalism, and human rights in 
particular, but reluctant, within the terms of its own methodology, to propose a model of its 
own, as a basis for reform.58 In reply, the author views this, therefore, as an opportunity to 
move the rights debate forward, in bridging the valid CLS criticisms of liberalism, with that 
ideology’s emphasis on the individual and antipathy towards increases in state power, which 
for this piece is particularly telling post 9/11, with other comparable theories more suited to 
addressing predictors of terrorism such as social exclusion and marginalisation. 
                                                 
57 Paul O’Connell, ‘On the Human Rights Question’ (2018) Human Rights Quarterly 
(forthcoming). There are scholars, such as Cass Sunstein – Cass Sunstein, ‘Rights and Their 
Critics’ (1999) 71 Notre Dame Law Review, 727-757 – who have deliberately sought to 
temper the CLS critical presentations of rights. Sunstein is not entirely dismissive of the CLS 
arguments: rather, their ‘plausible’ claims should be ‘stated far more cautiously and 
narrowly’ (729). First, Sunstein agrees with CLS, for example, that rights are indeterminate, 
but only when they are in the abstract. For Sunstein, rights in fact become determinate – 
‘specified’ – when they operate in law (742). It will also be recalled that Mark Tushnet was 
particularly dismissive of the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment, 
the right to speech. Although not responding to Tushnet directly, Sunstein would question 
whether this is really an attack on a specific right, free speech, in particular, rather than an 
attack on rights in general? (743-744). Sunstein rejects the argument that rights as interests 
operate only negatively: ‘The right to associational freedom is hardly individualistic. It is 
meant precisely to protect collective action and sociality.’ (745) Finally. Sunstein also states 
that many rights are best understood as a solution to a collective action problem, such as a 
lack of legal entitlements for specific groups within society such as prisoners (737). 
58 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White (n 38) 211. In the defence of CLS, Hunt, for example 
says: ‘Given the predominance of liberal legal theory, it is difficult to make the first steps in 
making out an alternative theory for each of us is deeply imbued with the influence of that 
tradition’ – see: Alan Hunt, ‘The Critique of Law: What is Critical About Critical Legal Theory’ 
(1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society, 5-20, 13. That said, Hunt believes that is ‘desirable and 
necessary’ to advance a general theory of law (5), which he discusses and describes as a 
‘relational’ theory of law (16-18). 
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Communitarianism is arguably one such philosophy and is discussed in detail in the next 
section.59 
 
Communitarianism and its emphasis on responsibilities 
 
Communitarianism, such as that proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre,60 Michael J Sandel,61 
Charles Taylor62 and Michael Walzer,63 began in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls’ 
A Theory of Justice. In A Theory of Justice, for example, Rawls arrived at his conception of 
justice by considering what individuals in the ‘original position’ would choose as principles 
of justice for the basic structure of society. They would decide behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
which prevented them from knowing their place in society, their class position or social 
status, their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their intelligence and 
their strength. This ensured that no one was advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of 
principles.64 
 
                                                 
59 Some commentators have sought to draw parallels with CLS and communitarianism much 
more closely – see, for example: Richard Bauman, ‘The Communitarian Vision of Critical 
Legal Studies’ (1988) 33 McGill Law Journal, 295-356. 
60 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (University of Notre Dame Press 
1981). 
61 Michael J Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. (Cambridge University Press 1982).  
62 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. (Harvard University 
Press 1989). 
63 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. (Basic Books 
1983). 
64 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Harvard University Press 1971) 136-142. (Individuals 
were not completely ignorant, however: they knew ‘the general facts about society’, for 
example (137)). Rawls believed two principles of justice would be chosen in the ‘original 
position’. The first of these, the ‘liberty principle’ was ‘each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar liberty for all’ (302). 
That is, each person would have the maximum amount of liberty without interfering with 
the similar liberties of others, which even the general welfare could not override (61). These 
‘basic liberties’ were political freedoms, such as speech, assembly and conscience, freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and freedom of personal property (61). For Rawls, the first principle of 
justice, which is appropriate to this chapter, prevailed over the second one because, for 
example, this dealt with constitutional fundamentals (63). The second principle of justice, 
which had two limbs, ‘the difference principle’ and ‘fair equality of opportunity’ (159-161), 
dealt with merely the operation of these constitutional fundamentals (63). 
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There are many reasons for communitarianism’s attack on A Theory of Justice but these are, 
sadly, beyond the limits of this piece.65 For the purposes of this chapter, in rejecting Rawls’s 
‘veil of ignorance’ hypothetical exercise, communitarians did not believe that individuals 
were born free and unencumbered, wholly autonomous agents seemingly living isolated 
lives, strangers to one another.66 MacIntyre, for example, believed that we all approached 
our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity:  
 
‘I am someone’s son or daughter, someone’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or 
that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, 
this nation…I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a 
variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute 
the given of my life, my moral staring point.’67 
 
Thus, for communitarians, liberalism, or at least Rawls’ approach to liberalism, in 
representing an overly individualistic conception of ‘the self’,68 was insufficiently sensitive to 
the importance of community, traditions and lived experiences.69 
 
A more recent communitarian theorist is Amitai Etzioni,70 who echoes the earlier 
communitarians in emphasising liberalism’s apparent neglect of community. He believes 
                                                 
65 For example, can we partake in Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ experiment from a neutral 
position? Sandel questions, for example, whether the principles of justice that govern the 
basic structure of society can be neutral with respect to the competing moral and religious 
convictions its citizens espouse? He believes that one way of linking justice with the 
conceptions of the good holds that principles of justice derive their moral force from values 
commonly espoused or widely shared in a particular community or tradition. This way of 
linking justice and the good is communitarian in the sense that the values of the community 
define what counts as just or unjust (n 61) ix-x. Thus, one of the main themes of 
communitarianism is that there are common formulations of the public good rather than 
leaving it to be determined by each individual; the state cannot remain neutral on the issue.  
66 Michael Walzer, ‘The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’ in Amitai Etzioni (ed), New 
Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions and Communities. (University of 
Virginia Press 1995), 52-70, 53-54. 
67 MacIntyre (n 60) 204-205. 
68 Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics. (Oxford University Press 1993) 4. 
69 ibid. 
70 Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society. 
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that neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the 
interdependence and overlapping communities to which we all belong. Nor can any 
community long survive unless its members dedicate some of their attention, energy, and 
resources to shared projects.71 But for Etzioni, another important communitarian principle, 
which is particularly relevant to this piece, is redressing the balance between liberalism’s 
emphasis on personal autonomy and social responsibilities, otherwise society will continue 
to be ‘self-centred and driven by self-interests’.72 
 
Rights talk, especially in the United States where Etzioni lives, is particularly silent on 
responsibilities. As an example, Etzioni refers to the opposition to seat belts and wearing 
motorcycle helmets. These people do not absorb the consequences of their acts. They are 
more likely to die and leave their children ‘for society to attend to and pick up the pieces’, as 
well as ignore the drain on public resources this will cause.73 Thus, for Etzioni, rights talk 
seemingly condones acceptance of the benefits of living in a social welfare state, without 
accepting the corresponding personal civic obligations. This is a view shared by Mary Ann 
Glendon. Glendon also believes that rights talk, particularly in America, captures a devotion 
to individualism and liberty, but omits America’s traditions of hospitality and care for the 
community.74 But this is not to reject human rights completely: a right, which is less 
individualistic and more responsive to collective ideals, is, for Glendon, Article 29(1) of the 
UDHR. Article 29(1) states: ‘Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free 
and full development of his personality is possible.’75 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Basic Books 1996); Amitai Etzioni (ed), The Essential Communitarian Reader. (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers 1998).  
71 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities’ in 
Amitai Etzioni (ed). Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian Perspective. (St 
Martin’s Press 1995), 11-23, 11. 
72 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Old Chestnuts and New Spurs’ in Amitai Etzioni (ed), New Communitarian 
Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions and Communities. (University of Virginia Press 1995) 
22. 
73 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society. (Touchstone 
1994) 6. 
74 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. (Free Press 
1991) xi-xii. 
75 ibid 13. 
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The ’communitarian’ African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The recognition of duties and responsibilities within human rights law is particularly 
developed in the African region: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 
for example. In relying on criticisms of liberalism, one can advance the ACHPR as a way of, 
not only a human rights re-engagement with the critical readership of the Daily Mail, but 
redressing, to some degree, indictors of terrorism such as inequality and unemployment.76 
The author has already noted that grounding his approach in rights via CLS, for example, and 
especially Mark Tushnet, may seem like an obvious contradiction. However, CLS criticisms of 
rights, and communitarian ones to a lesser degree, are founded on a hostility towards a 
liberal bias within the law, of which the natural, negative, ‘freedoms’ from the state are a 
principal target – the approach to rights adopted within the ACHPR is much less 
individualistic and much more progressive than classic models of rights.77 The ACHPR 
includes a group of articles on socio-economic rights, as well as duties. The primary reason 
was that the founding states wished to put forward a distinctive conception of human rights 
in which civil and political rights were seen to be counterbalanced by duties of social 
solidarity.78 
 
Before proceeding, however, a qualification: it is commonly accepted amongst human rights 
commentators that many of the rights contained within the ACHPR lack definition.79 Indeed, 
one commentator goes as far as to say: ‘The duties [for example] are of such breadth and so 
ambiguous in their connotations that a regime of serious enforcement without some degree 
                                                 
76 For more discussions about communitarianism and the ACHPR in general, see, for 
example: Thaddeus Metz, ‘African Values, Human Rights and Group Rights: A Philosophical 
Foundation for the Banjul Charter’ (2013) African Legal Theory and Contemporary 
Problems, 131-151. 
77 For criticisms of attaching too much weight to first generation rights in the African human 
rights debate, see, for example: Claude Ake, ‘The African Context of Human Rights’ (1987) 
34 Africa Today, 5–12; and Josiah Cobbah, ‘African Values and the Human Rights Debate: 
An African Perspective’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly, 309-331. 
78 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law. 2nd ed. (Pearson Education 2009) 311. 
79 See, for example, Rhona Smith, International Human Rights Law. 8th ed. (Oxford 
University Press 2017) 141; and Rehman (n 78) 327.  
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of prior elaboration is difficult to imagine.’80 Thus, in the absence of a significant body of 
human rights law – other than the Charter itself – developed and refined by relevant 
institutions within the African region such as the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the author of this 
chapter is free to propose an interpretation and application of the ACHPR of his own. 
 
The ACHPR begins with ‘negative’ human rights from the liberal tradition: the right to life, 
Article 4; the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, Article 5; 
the right to personal liberty and protection from arbitrary arrest, Article 6; and the right to a 
fair trial, Article 7, for example. But it proceeds to socio-economic, ‘positive’, ‘rights to’, such 
as the right to work, Article 15; the right to health, Article 16; and the right to education, 
Article 17. More progressively, the ACHPR also includes rights more associated with 
‘communitarian’ ideals, conferring rights on ‘peoples’, not just individuals: the right of all 
peoples to equality and rights, Article 19; the right of all peoples to economic, social and 
cultural development, Article 22; and the right of all peoples to national and international 
security and peace, Article 23.81 Lastly, seemingly mirroring communitarian thinking towards 
responsibilities, there are ‘duties’ of the individual, rather than rights, which one human 
rights commentator has described as ‘unprecedented in so far as human rights treaties are 
concerned’:82 every individual shall have duties towards their family and society, the state 
and other legally recognized communities and the international community, Article 27; and 
every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider their fellow beings without 
discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing 
mutual respect and tolerance, Article 28. Indeed, Article 29 also states that each individual 
shall have the duty: not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident 
                                                 
80 Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2012) 520. For further reading on the language of duties within the ACHPR, see, for 
example: Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An 
Evaluation of the Language of Duties’ 35 (1995) Virginal Journal of International Law, 339-
380. 
81 Rehman (n 78) 327. For a discussion of whether peoples’ rights can actually legitimately 
claim to be human rights, since, for example, they are not rights of human beings, see: Peter 
Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples' Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly, 
80-107. 
82 Rehman (n 78) 311. 
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they are; to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the 
latter is threatened; and to preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in their 
relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and 
consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well-being of 
society. 
 
In addressing the criticisms of human rights from, say, readers of the Daily Mail, the ACHPR 
does contain rights that some would naturally see as inhibiting the state’s attempts to 
counter terrorism: the right to personal liberty and protection from arbitrary arrest, Article 
6; and the right to a fair trial, Article 7. But the ACHPR does attach much less weight to the 
rights of the individual terror suspect, in conferring rights on ‘peoples’. Article 23 of the 
ACHPR, the right of all peoples to national and international security and peace, is one such 
right which could certainly divert significant attention away from the so-called undeserving 
terrorist towards those of the deserving victim. Moreover, there are also ACHPR rights that 
could inevitably address some of the indicators of terrorism outlined above, such as 
unemployment and poor educational opportunities: the right to work, Article 15; and the 
right to education, Article 17. The significance of the duties within the ACHPR, in preventing 
terrorism, for example, cannot be overstated either. Article 28, it will be recalled, imposes 
the obligation on individuals to maintain relations with their fellow human beings to 
promote, safeguard and reinforce mutual respect and tolerance. Of course terrorists could 
be in violation of this obligation but they would not be the only ones upon whom this duty 
was imposed: everybody could have a responsibility to look out for others in their 
community, particularly the young who are much more susceptible to exploitation, to avoid 
the perils of social isolation. Where there was a suspicion that a person had been 
radicalised, then Article 29 could be engaged, in imposing obligations on individuals not to 
compromise the security of the state. Again, terrorists could be in violation of this Article, 
but in this instance the individual, upon whom this duty could also be imposed, would not 
be the individual extremist, but could be someone else, perhaps a religious leader schooled 
in a counter jihadist narrative, or a community youth worker with an expertise in techniques 
of diversion. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the so called ‘War on Terror’ many, particularly those in the media, see human rights 
merely as a vehicle to secure the ‘undeserving’ rights of terror suspects over the ‘deserving’ 
rights of victims. The idea that human rights protect the ‘few’ over the ‘many’ has arguably 
contributed to a disengagement with the topic of rights. But human rights are not the 
preserve of the classic liberal tradition, with its emphasis on protecting the individual from 
the state, as security is being compromised much more by non-state actors. Indeed, human 
rights law is more far-reaching than liberalism suggests, as the rights of ‘peoples’ within the 
ACHPR signify. In particular, there is Article 23 of the ACHPR, the right of all peoples to 
national and international security and peace. A greater understanding of this right, for 
example, or a wider acceptance of it beyond the African region, should reassure a nervous 
populace, post 9/11, and redress the apparent bias within human rights towards an 
‘unworthy’ minority. At the same time, the related liberal suspicions about increases in state 
power have seemingly ignored primary indicators of terrorism. Noting the nature of recent 
Islamist terrorists in the West – many are recent Muslim converts, with a criminal history – 
and the factors affecting their recruitment – inequality, marginalisation, unemployment etc 
– perhaps, within current discussions of human rights, we should prioritise this apparent 
isolation and lack of educational opportunities and attach greater weight to collective ideals 
such as the positive, ‘rights to’ work and education? Such an approach is consistent with 
critical legal approaches to the law, and human rights in particular, since, for that tradition, 
the balance falls too much in favour of negative freedoms.  However, a wider acceptance of 
rights, beyond the first and second generations, to those freedoms that are more socially 
inclusive, that foster a communal sense of duty and responsibility, along the lines of, say, 
Articles 28 and 29 of the ACHPR, are surely a significant, additional way forward in re-
engaging with the topic of rights, particularly in times of crisis? 
